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cent below the level of 2008. Serious concerns remain 
about the ability of the institutions of UK economic 
policymaking to steer the economy out of nearly five 
years of stagnation and into a sustainable recovery.
Despite the current gloom, the UK has many assets that 
it can mobilise to its advantage, such as the strong rule 
of law, generally competitive product markets, flexible 
labour markets, a world-class university system and 
strengths in many key sectors, with cutting-edge firms 
in both manufacturing and services. These and other 
assets helped to reverse the UK’s relative economic 
decline over the century before 1980 and we can do 
this again. 
The Commission argues that the UK should build on 
these strengths, but needs to address its weaknesses. 
Our weaknesses are reflected in years of inadequate 
long-term investment in skills, infrastructure and 
innovation. This failure to invest is rooted in an 
inability to achieve stable planning, strategic vision and 
a political consensus on the right policy framework to 
support growth. This must change if we are to meet 
our current challenges posed by a world economy 
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introduction
At the end of January 2013 the LSE Growth Commission 
produced a report looking at the institutions and 
policies that should underpin growth for the next 50 
years (LSE Growth Commission, 2013, henceforth 
‘The Commission’). In the course of a year we brought 
together a range of perspectives from academia, 
policymaking and business with nine Commissioners,1 
many public evidence sessions and a full time secretariat 
“boiling the ocean” for existing relevant material. The 
Commissioners were united by two shared beliefs. First, 
that it is vital to look beyond the next budget cycle, the 
next spending review and the next parliament when 
making long-term investment decisions. Second, that in 
developing a UK growth strategy it is important to take 
political economy seriously because the policy proposals 
must be both politically feasible and robust to swings in 
policy-makers’ sentiments.
At the time of writing, the nation remains scarred by 
the worst economic crisis in many generations, casting 
a shadow over the prospects for the next half-century 
and what it will bring. Output has been depressed for 
a longer period than it was in the Great Depression, 
with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) still over 3 per 
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that plays a major role in the economy – as in the UK 
– places a premium on well-designed policies that 
support growth. Achieving this is dependent on having 
an institutional framework that is able to support good 
policies.
Growth in its most traditional sense – i.e. GDP growth 
– reflects the increase in real output. Society values 
these gains in so far as they may lead to improvements 
in citizens’ wellbeing through higher consumption, 
greater leisure and/or improved public services. The 
fruits of growth are particularly meaningful when they 
are inclusive, i.e. affecting a large share of society rather 
than being exclusively appropriated by a small, fortunate 
part of it (e.g. Sen 1976, 1979; Atkinson, 1970; Stiglitz 
et al., 2009). Some of the investments discussed below 
have an important impact on the inclusiveness of growth 
– for example, equipping citizens with appropriate skills 
gives them the best chance of participating in the process 
of growth.
uk decline and rebound
Although the UK has enjoyed significant improvements 
in material wellbeing for well over two centuries, UK 
GDP per capita was in relative decline compared with 
other leading countries, such as France, Germany and 
where skills, flexibility, openness and receptiveness to 
technological change are becoming ever more important 
for prosperity. 
This paper offers a summary of the core analysis and 
propositions presented by the Commission. Section 2 
makes a few remarks on the growth process. This is 
followed by an overview of the UK’s economic story to 
date in section 3. Section 4 focuses on skills. Section 5 
looks at investment in infrastructure, namely transport 
and energy. Section 6 discusses private investment 
and innovation issues. We finish with comments on 
the measurement of economic prosperity (section 7), 
followed by a few concluding thoughts.
the growth process
Modern growth theory argues that, in the long run, it 
is the accumulation of ideas – scientific, technological 
and managerial – that makes it possible to do more 
with the raw materials that we have (e.g. Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992, 1998). Sustainable growth is not about 
increasing raw labour input but rather about finding 
ways to do new things as well as doing the same things 
more efficiently. 
A dynamic economy requires investment of three main 
varieties: in people (human capital), in equipment and 
physical structures (infrastructure) and in new ideas and 
technologies (innovation). Investments in education and 
research and development (R&D) help to create new 
ideas and extend the technological frontier, but they 
may also help a country to catch up with leading edge 
countries, making it possible for firms to learn about and 
absorb innovations from elsewhere (Griffith, Redding 
and Van Reenen, 2004).
There is no reliable evidence suggesting that the growth 
potential of an economy is limited by the size of the 
government over the wide range that we observe in 
the OECD countries. The twentieth century witnessed 
a significant increase in the size and responsibilities of 
government throughout the developed world alongside 
large and sustained significant increases in living 
standards (e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). The 
historical diversity of international experiences suggests 
that different types of market economy can be successful 
with high or moderate levels of state spending – for 
example, Scandinavia versus the US. Thus, demands for 
ever greater deregulation and reductions in government 
spending as a panacea for the UK’s growth problems are 
misguided. Growth is less about the precise size of the 
state and more about whether the state is smart in the 
way it taxes, regulates and spends. Having a government 
Figure 1. GDP per capita 1870–2007 (UK=100)
Source: Crafts (2012). 
Notes: In each year the base is UK=100 and each country’s GDP 
per capita is relative to this. So a value of US=120, for example, 
implies the US has a 20 per cent higher GDP per capita than the 
UK. GDP per capita is expressed in 1990 International Geary-
Khamis dollars.
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the US, from at least 1870 onwards (see figure 1). The 
UK’s relative decline reflected an almost inevitable catch-
up of other countries whose institutions created the right 
kind of investment climate. But by the late 1970s the 
UK had been comprehensively overtaken; US GDP per 
capita was 40 per cent higher than the UK’s and the 
major continental European countries were 10–15 per 
cent ahead. The subsequent three decades, in contrast, 
saw the UK’s relative performance improve substantially, 
so that by 2007, on the eve of the crisis, UK GDP per 
capita had overtaken both France and Germany and 
reduced significantly the gap with the US.
Figure 2 shows trends in UK GDP per capita since 1950. 
After falling behind for most of the postwar period, 
the UK had a better performance compared with other 
leading countries after the 1970s. Figure 3 focuses on 
the later years (partially correcting for demographics by 
looking at GDP per adult rather than GDP per capita) 
and shows a similar story of a strong relative performance 
especially before 2008.
The improvement in GDP per capita can be broken down 
into increases in the employment rate (the proportion of 
the adult population that is working) and increases in 
labour productivity (GDP per worker or GDP per hour 
worked). Jobs growth in the UK was facilitated by an 
improvement in the functioning of the labour market 
through more activist employment policies (such as 
Restart and the New Deal for Young People) and greater 
wage and job flexibility. But productivity growth was 
also impressive; among the G6 countries, the growth of 
UK GDP per hour was second only to the US in the 
decade to 2007 and the growth of the employment rate 
was better than that of the US. 
The current crisis has led some to question if these 
productivity improvements were a mere statistical 
illusion, driven by artificial productivity increases in 
finance. The evidence we reviewed, however, strongly 
suggests this was not the case. First, the improvements 
were widely spread across industrial sectors (figure 
4). Second, the way the Office of National Statistics 
measures GDP places substantial limitations on the 
potential for the measurement of financial services to 
bias GDP calculations significantly (Oulton, 2013).
Figure 3. Trends in real GDP per working age adult, 
1980–2011 (1995=100)
Source: Conference Board data, extracted on 8 June 2012. 
Notes: GDP is US$, constant prices, constant PPPs, base year 2011. 
The number of working age adults, which is obtained from the US 
Bureau of Labour Force Statistics, includes the civilian population 
aged over 16. Data for unified Germany is from 1991. For each 
country the series is set to one hundred in 1995, so the level of the 
line in any year indicates the cumulative growth rate (for example, 
a value of 110 in 2001 indicates that the series has grown by 10 per 
cent between 1995 and 2001). The steeper the slope of the line, 
the faster growth has been over that period.
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Figure 2. GDP per capita 1950–2011 (1980=100)
Source: Conference Board data, extracted on 8 June 2012. 
Notes: GDP is US$, constant prices, constant PPPs, base year 
2011. For each country the series is set to one hundred in 1980, 
so the level of the line in any year indicates the cumulative growth 
rate (for example, a value of 110 in 2001 indicates that the series 
has grown by 10 per cent between 1980 and 2001). The steeper 
the slope of the line, the faster growth has been over that period.
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There is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that 
a range of important policy changes underpinned these 
economic gains (see for example Corry, Valero and Van 
Reenen 2011; Card, Blundell and Freeman 2004; OECD 
2012a). These include increases in product market 
competition through the withdrawal of industrial 
subsidies, a movement to effective competition in 
many privatised sectors with independent regulators, a 
strengthening of competition policy and our membership 
of the EU’s internal market. There were also increases 
in labour-market flexibility through improving job 
search for those on benefits, reducing replacement rates, 
increasing in-work benefits and restricting union power. 
The UK was open to foreign business and global talent; 
restrictions on foreign direct investment were eased in 
the 1980s and restrictions on immigration relaxed in 
the late 1990s. And there was a sustained expansion of 
the higher education system; the share of working-age 
adults with a university degree rose from 5 per cent in 
1980 to 14 per cent in 1996 and 31 per cent in 2011, a 
faster increase than in France, Germany or the US. The 
combination of these policies helped the UK to bridge 
the GDP per capita gap with other leading nations.
failure to invest 
Although the UK’s economic performance over the 
past three decades certainly has much to commend it, 
a number of issues went unresolved. Inequality rose 
Figure 4. Finance directly contributed only a small part of market sector productivity growth
Source: Corry et al. (2011) using EU-KLEMS data. 
Notes: These numbers are for the ‘market economy’. This excludes the sectors where value added is hard to measure: education, health, 
public administration and property. 
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dramatically from the late 1970s onwards (figure 5). 
Some of this was related to worldwide pressures of 
technological change and international trade which have 
increased the demand for skilled workers (Van Reenen, 
2011). Policies such as the weakening of unions and the 
lowering of welfare benefits also played a role. Lower 
marginal rates on the better-off and reductions in real 
benefit levels during the 1980s exacerbated the degree 
of post-tax income inequality. This trend was reversed 
in the mid-1990s as in-work benefits became much more 
generous (for example, working family tax credits). In 
addition, the national minimum wage, introduced in 
1999, helped to narrow inequality at the lower end of 
the wage distribution. But less has been accomplished 
in addressing some of the sources of wage inequality, 
for example, by improving skills at the lower half of the 
distribution.
Failure to invest was not confined to skills but extended 
to infrastructure. This contrasts with the industrial 
revolution when the UK’s major investments in roads, 
canals and railways supported growth and industrial 
transformation. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the UK was also at the forefront of investments 
in electrification and sanitation, enabling dramatic gains 
in living standards. The dynamism that saw the provision 
of infrastructure enabling the growth of the UK as an 
industrial power seems to have all but evaporated.
Long-term investments require a stable policy 
environment within which investors can manage risk 
since returns often accrue over decades, well beyond 
the typical parliamentary cycle. Stability is fostered by 
having a predictable policy framework, where possible 
backed by a cross-party consensus. Failure to create 
such conditions undermines investments, posing a 
serious impediment to growth. Thus, to understand 
the recent lack of investment dynamism we need to 
understand why the UK has failed to create an enabling 
environment in a number of important areas for growth. 
This, in turn, requires an understanding of the nature of 
the institutions that support investment.
The evidence suggests that policy instability is an 
enduring feature of these institutions in the UK. This 
is compounded by a number of properties of the UK 
political process. First, the time horizons of politicians 
are typically truncated as they are moved swiftly 
between ministerial posts and face the electorate every 
four or five years.2 Second, the adversarial nature of 
UK politics creates a tendency towards policy switches 
(and subsequent reinvention) as governments change. 
Sometimes this means rebranding and reorganisations. 
In some cases, there is genuine uncertainty about 
whether the policy framework that is in place will last. 
The pressure of bad publicity weighs heavily on political 
decisions and makes it harder for politicians to take 
unpopular decisions. Third, political debates often lack 
guidance from independent, evidence-based advice. The 
civil service must maintain the confidence of ministers 
and is constitutionally barred from advising anyone but 
the government of the day. Civil servants’ incentives are 
typically more focused on helping to deliver policies 
than on helping governments (or others) structure their 
thinking in the longer-term interests of society as a 
whole. 
Too often, the result is a costly cocktail of political 
procrastination, institutional churn and poor decision-
making. ‘Celebrity reviews’ are often set up to come 
to the rescue, sometimes as a genuine attempt to 
fill an institutional gap but more often to serve an 
instrumental purpose, leaving many of the key problems 
unaddressed. 
Uncertainty and poor decision-making are not inevitable 
outcomes of governing collective affairs in a democratic 
framework. They are instead the result of flaws in the 
design of the institutions that define that framework, 
Figure 5. Wage inequality 1979–2010
Source: Lindley and Machin (2012) using data from NES and ASHE 
(1 per cent sample of all UK workers). 
Notes: Difference in the natural logarithm of weekly wages of full-
time (‘FT’) workers at the 90th percentile (richest tenth) and 10th 
percentile (poorest tenth). 
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distorting the incentives of those who represent the 
electorate, and clouding transparency and accountability. 
That this is not an inevitability of a modern democracy 
can be readily inferred from other areas where the UK has 
led the way in seeking innovative institutional solutions 
for designing and implementing policy. This has often 
involved refining the balance between political discretion, 
technocratic input and the use of rules. Perhaps the 
longest standing example is our system of common law, 
which has allowed independent courts to oversee the 
evolution of the law while operating at a distance from 
political interference. More recent examples include the 
conduct of competition policy which under the 1998 
Competition Act and the 2002 Enterprise Act, reduced 
political lobbying in large-scale mergers; the decision to 
give the Bank of England independence to set interest 
rates after 1997, allowing monetary policy to be based 
on sound and transparent expert advice; the regulation 
of privatised services, such as telecoms, energy, and water 
underpinned by a framework of rules that safeguards the 
public interest along with a stable investment climate; 
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, which has 
helped to create a better informed and less polarised 
debate around the choices of health treatments in the 
NHS; and a number of advisory bodies such as the Low 
Pay Commission, advising on the minimum wage; the 
National Pay Review Bodies for public sector workers; 
and the Climate Change Committee. 
Two main lessons follow from these experiences. First, 
it is important to focus politics on the debates and 
decisions that involve strategic choices, definition of 
high-level objectives and rules. Other aspects of policy 
formulation and implementation often benefit from 
some degree of insulation from short-term political 
pressures. This is particularly relevant for policies that 
have effects on investments with long gestation periods 
(e.g. infrastructure), including those where problems of 
time inconsistency are more likely to develop. Second, 
the political debate needs to be framed by independent, 
transparent, expert advice, subject to parliamentary 
oversight and strategic political guidance. In the rest of 
the paper, we discuss how these lessons can be extended 
further to foster a better climate to encourage investments 
in human capital, infrastructure and innovation.
Human capital
Diagnosis 
Both economic theory and empirical evidence show 
that, in the long run, human capital is a critical input for 
growth. The growth dividend from upgrading human 
capital is potentially enormous and improving the quality 
of compulsory education is the key to achieving these 
gains. There is also a double dividend from improving 
human capital, especially at the bottom of the skills 
distribution. Not only will this improve growth, but 
because most of the gains would accrue to the less well-
off inequality will also be reduced.
A large number of international studies show that high 
quality teaching is the key to improving schools (Slater 
et al, 2009; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2010). There are 
well-established positive effects from extra resources, 
improved buildings, higher pay (especially when linked 
to performance), extended provision of information 
technology and smaller class sizes. But these effects 
appear to be modest in comparison with the large 
benefits that could be realised by increasing the quality 
of teachers (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006).
The UK is mid-table overall in most international 
rankings of schools: it is mediocre in the internationally 
comparable tests in the OECD’s PISA scores (taken at 
age 15), although it does somewhat better in the more 
curriculum-based TIMSS (taken at ages 10 and 15). 
Indicators of the UK’s average educational outcomes have 
shown significant improvements, some of which is grade 
inflation, but some of which is real. Most impressive is 
the increase in the proportion of the workforce with a 
university degree (from 5 per cent in 1980 to 31 per cent 
in 2011).
One major systemic failing in the UK education system 
is the ‘long tail’ of poorly performing schools and pupils 
compared with other countries, particularly at the 
secondary level. A significant part of the explanation for 
this is the stubborn link between pupils’ socio-economic 
background and their educational attainment. For 
example, a fifth of children in England on free school 
meals (a common measure of disadvantage) do not 
reach the expected maths level at age 7 (Key Stage 1) 
and this proportion rises to a third by age 11 (Key Stage 
2). The correlation between disadvantage and poor 
academic attainment is particularly strong in the UK. 
Our failure to provide adequate education to children 
from disadvantaged backgrounds constitutes a waste 
of human resources on a grand scale. It holds back 
economic opportunities and is detrimental to growth.
Disadvantaged children are found in many schools and 
generally perform poorly compared with their better-off 
peers even when located in better schools. Disadvantaged 
children lose out because most schools face weak 
incentives to focus on their performance. First, parental 
choice is seriously constrained by place of residence and 
is still mainly a prerogative of better-off families who 
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The expansion of new sponsored (a sponsor may be 
a university, business or private/public network that 
brings in management and leadership skills) academies 
should be focused on underperforming schools serving 
disadvantaged children. The original programme was 
shown to be very successful in doing this (Machin and 
Vernoit, 2010). But the post-2010 academies are less 
focused on this group of schools.
Teacher recruitment and training would be improved 
through better conditions for both entry and exit. 
To achieve that we recommend expanding Teach 
First (renowned for its outstanding track record in 
recruiting high quality graduates) until it becomes 
one of the main routes into school teaching; making 
mainstream teacher recruitment more concentrated in 
the best providers (i.e. best universities and schools), 
following a national recruitment process; extending the 
probation period – for example, by doubling it from 
two to four years; relaxing policies that rely on grades, 
qualifications and backgrounds so as to encourage a 
wider range of applications and reflecting the fact that 
teacher effectiveness is not highly correlated with crude 
background indicators (Rivkin el al., 2005); and finally, 
encouraging more strongly mechanisms for teachers and 
schools to share best practice (in this respect, aspects 
of  the ‘London Challenge’ programme have shown how 
successful this could be (Hutchings et al., 2012).
infrastructure
Diagnosis 
Investments in infrastructure, such as transport, energy, 
telecoms and housing, are essential inputs into economic 
growth.5 They are complementary to many other forms 
of investment. They also tend to be large-scale and long-
term, requiring high levels of coordination to maximise 
the wider benefits that they offer. This makes it inevitable 
that governments will play a vital role in planning, 
delivering and (to some extent) financing such projects 
(e.g. Helm, 2010; Jamison et al., 2005). 
Historically, attempts to overcome market failures 
in infrastructure investment have led to a mixture 
of government ownership and provision on the one 
hand and private sector regulation on the other. This, 
in turn, has exposed infrastructure investment to 
important policy risks and decision-making biases that 
damage investment prospects: lack of clarity about 
strategy, frequent reversals and prevarication over key 
decisions;6 difficulty in basing decisions on sound advice 
and assessment of policy alternatives built on unbiased 
appraisals; limitations of a planning system that does 
not properly share the benefits of development thus 
can buy houses near good schools (Burgess et al., 2009). 
Second, school autonomy remains limited since a large 
number of schools still operate under heavy constraints 
due to the power of local authorities. Local authorities 
are generally reluctant to allow popular schools to 
expand and underperforming schools to contract. Thus, 
in practice most schools have a guaranteed intake, 
regardless of how they perform. Third, the accountability 
system is not working to the advantage of deprived 
children – the framework for school inspections places 
insufficient emphasis on pupil performance across the 
range of achievement levels; while government’s ‘floor 
targets’3 fail to focus on the ‘lower tail’ of performance 
within schools. 
Deficiencies in teacher recruitment and training are 
another compounding factor. Selection into teacher 
training is tight at the beginning of the course but 
negligible thereafter. Tightening academic entry 
requirements still further is not the answer; such 
policies restrict the number of recruits without having a 
significant impact on teaching effectiveness (Allen and 
Burgess, 2012).
Core recommendations
We argue that the school system should deepen into 
a ‘flexible ecology’ with four critical parts: greater 
school autonomy, strengthened central accountability 
(transparent information and inspection), wider parental 
choice and more flexibility for successful schools and 
their sponsors to expand.
To improve school governance, leadership and 
management, it must become easier for outstanding 
sponsored academies4 to grow, both by making physical 
expansion easier, but more importantly through enabling 
networks of academies to expand through takeovers and 
so spread best practice. By the same token, it should be 
made easier for underperforming schools to shrink and, 
if they do not improve, to be taken over or, in extreme 
cases, closed down. 
Changes to help to develop the talent of disadvantaged 
pupils include changing information on school performance 
in league tables, the regulator’s inspections regime, and 
in national ‘floor targets’ to reflect better the progress of 
disadvantaged children. This should involve moving away 
from undifferentiated average performance targets (such 
as one of the current ‘floor targets’, which requires 40 per 
cent of A* to C passes at GCSE level). These are ‘blind’ 
targets that distort schools’ incentives to target resources 
and support towards those children who can more readily 
be expected to reach the pre-defined threshold. 
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•	 An	 Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC), 
which would be charged with delivering on the ISB’s 
strategic priorities. This body existed in the recent 
past. It has now been replaced by the Infrastructure 
Planning Unit under the auspices of the Department 
for Communities and Local Government. This change 
reintroduced ministerial approval for projects and we 
believe that independence from ministerial decision-
making should be restored. The IPC is designed to 
give predictability and effectiveness to (mostly private) 
investment that drives implementation of strategy. It 
must not be misunderstood as a ‘central planner’.
•	 An	Infrastructure Bank (IB) to facilitate the provision 
of stable, long-term, predictable, mostly private sector 
finance for infrastructure. The creation of such a 
bank can help to reduce policy risk and, through 
partnerships, to structure finance in a way that 
mitigates and shares risk efficiently. Good practical 
examples that show the advantages of a bank with this 
sort of mandate include Brazil’s BNDES, Germany’s 
KfW, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and, to some extent, the European 
Investment Bank.9  
•	 Compensation schemes to extend the benefits of 
infrastructure projects to those who might otherwise 
stand to lose, either due to disruption caused by the 
construction phase or by the long-term impact on 
land and/or property values. Such compensation 
schemes should be enshrined in law and built into 
the thinking of the ISB and the operations of the IPC. 
Under current arrangements compensation is low and 
incentivising small groups of influential citizens and 
politicians to veto or cause egregious delay to projects 
with wide economic benefits; and, finally, a series of public 
sector accounting distortions that have made it difficult to 
weigh up benefits and costs in a coherent way.7 
These problems affect all major public sector capital 
projects to some degree, but they vary in their severity. 
The consequences for long-term growth and patterns 
of development in the UK also vary. We focus mainly 
on transport and energy where the problems are well-
understood and where the potential damage to growth 
is likely to be more severe. 
Underinvestment and inadequate maintenance 
characterise the provision of roads, railways and airports 
(Newbery, 2012). There are particular inefficiencies in 
how transport is priced and how decisions are made and 
financed. The 2006 Eddington review8 cited a potential 
cost of £22 billion per annum in increased congestion 
by 2025 if the transport network does not keep up with 
demand. The UK lacks a long-term strategic vision based 
on coherent and transparent criteria.
More than a fifth of the UK’s electricity-generating 
capacity will have gone out of commission within the 
next ten years. Ofgem, the regulator of the energy sector, 
has warned there could be an imminent drop in spare 
electricity capacity from a margin of 14 per cent at 
present to just 4 per cent by 2015 (Ofgem, 2012). Yet, 
successive UK governments have failed to deliver stable, 
credible long-term policy/regulatory environments that 
are capable of attracting private investment in the scale 
and manner required to meet these challenges. 
Core recommendations
The persistent failure of infrastructure policy in the UK 
requires a new approach. Our main proposal is for a 
new institutional architecture to govern infrastructure 
strategy, delivery and finance. A set of complementary 
institutions is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Our proposal has three core institutions: 
•	 An	 Infrastructure Strategy Board (ISB): to provide 
independent expert advice on infrastructure issues. 
It would lay the foundation for a well-informed, 
cross-party consensus to underpin stable long-term 
policy. The ISB would support evidence-gathering 
from experts and operate thorough, transparent and 
wide-ranging public consultations, engaging interested 
parties and members of the public in the debate over 
the costs and benefits of policy options. 
Figure 6. The new institutional architecture for 
infrastructure
Infrastructure
Strategy Board
Parliament &
Government
Infrastructure
Bank
Independent
Planning 
Commission

 
Strategic advice Policy goals
Policy framework National policy 
statements
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primarily communal, so poorly targeted at those who 
incur costs from development.
We believe our proposed infrastructure institutions 
would facilitate long-term planning and reduce policy 
instability in the planning, delivery and financing of an 
infrastructure strategy for the UK. The new institutional 
architecture would allow government to choose its 
priorities and decide on strategy. But crucially, it would 
ensure that political decisions are taken at the right 
place; that they do not expand to aspects of strategy 
and/or implementation where they add little value 
and can be a costly source of instability (for example, 
planning); and that they represent credible commitments 
for current and prospective investors. Moreover, the new 
framework would support a political debate informed by 
rigorous, independent assessment of policy alternatives, 
fostering the formation of cross-party consensus where 
possible, making political procrastination harder and 
thus generally improving the quality of policymaking. 
private investment and innovation
Diagnosis 
Investment is central to innovation and the process of 
‘creative destruction’ or reallocation, whereby more 
efficient and innovative firms grow and less successful 
firms shrink and exit. Much of the aggregate differences in 
productivity across countries and growth in productivity 
over time comes from this creative destruction (e.g. 
Bartelsman et al., 2012). A supportive environment for 
investment and innovation is therefore paramount for a 
dynamic and productive economy.
Various dimensions of the policy environment have a 
bearing on investment and innovation.10 Access to 
finance is amongst the most important (Beck, 2012) and 
yet many UK businesses still face structural obstacles 
in raising finance from external sources. The existence 
of structural financing gaps has been documented from 
as early as 1931 (Macmillan Committee, 1931). The 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) 
periodically conducts demand surveys among SME 
employers which suggest that there are still market 
failures that prevent viable SMEs from accessing 
finance.11 While there are certain financing issues which 
are pervasive for firms of all sizes, a key focus is on SMEs 
and SME-specific funding shortfalls. SMEs are a large 
fraction of the UK economy, accounting for 99.9 per 
cent of all UK businesses and over half of private sector 
employment and turnover in 2011 (BIS, 2012).
One consequence is that the UK has for decades invested 
less than other rich European countries at each stage 
of business development (NESTA, 2012).12 In 2008, the 
UK’s share of total GDP devoted to R&D stood at 1.8 
per cent, a lower proportion than in the US (2.8 per 
cent), Germany (2.7 per cent) or France (2.1 per cent). 
Some of the problems with investment and innovation 
seem to be linked to a series of failures in the functioning 
of capital markets – including lack of competition in 
retail banking;13 lack of economies of scale in SME 
lending (Skidelsky et al., 2011); and hyperactivity of 
mergers and acquisitions (Kay, 2012) which incentivise 
short-termist behaviour (Haldane and Davies, 2011) and 
harm the financing of innovation (BIS, 2012). Businesses 
lacking track record and collateral have struggled to gain 
access to debt finance, despite advances in credit scoring 
techniques which help lower the cost of assessing business 
proposals. This has negative effects on young start-up 
businesses that require external sources of finance.
To avoid the transaction costs of undertaking due 
diligence, private equity investors tend to favour fewer, 
larger investments in later stage businesses at the expense 
of early stage venture capital for viable SMEs with high 
growth potential.
Raising growth capital for established businesses looking 
to expand has also been a long-standing challenge; 
banks have typically been resistant to providing growth 
capital due to limited data on financial returns to 
such investment (BIS, 2009). Moreover, while the UK 
has performed well in attracting inward investment, 
it has performed poorly in creating leading global 
firms. Productive entrants do not grow to scale nearly 
as quickly as in the US and this slow ‘reallocation’ is 
an important drag on relative productivity. Too often 
UK firms in high-tech and capital-intensive sectors are 
acquired by foreign businesses instead of being able to 
raise growth capital themselves. Long-term investment 
is discouraged by investor impatience and a hyperactive 
mergers and acquisitions market. 
Core recommendations on private investment
Addressing these problems is not easy. The Commission 
welcomes recent short-term measures such as the 
‘funding for lending’ scheme to deal with the lending 
drought. But this scheme is not designed to deal with 
structural issues.
One important route with longer lasting benefits could 
be through spurring increased competition in retail 
banking. The direction of travel in recent years has been 
in the opposite direction since HBOS was absorbed 
by Lloyds-TSB in 2008. But there is a mounting case 
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success. Rarely a release of quarterly GDP estimates goes 
by without dominating media attention and generating 
widespread public discussion about the state of the 
economy. To some extent, there are good reasons for 
this to happen (e.g. Oulton, 2012). Changes in real GDP 
offer valuable insights for the conduct of macroeconomic 
policies, for the accounting of productivity, and for 
learning about the dynamics of other variables of 
interest with which it tends to be correlated (e.g. in cross-
country data GDP tends to be positively correlated with 
life expectancy and negatively correlated with infant 
mortality).
Notwithstanding its many virtues, GDP is ill suited as a 
measure of material living standards. Indeed it was never 
conceived with that purpose in mind.15 Its limitations 
have been extensively discussed over the years (see 
Stliglitz et al, 2009, for a comprehensive review) – e.g. 
a range of variables important for living standards are 
absent from GDP or only imperfectly incorporated in 
its calculation (e.g. public services, leisure, mortality, 
morbidity, crime); GDP is a flow variable and so fails 
to assess the sustainability of current living standards; 
and in the presence of large changes in the income 
distribution, GDP (per capita) is unlikely to reflect 
adequately the situation in which most people in society 
find themselves.
The Commission does not believe that any single indicator 
captures well all aspects of individuals’ living standards. 
There will continue to be useful debates about progress 
on the environment, inequality, tax policy and public 
services – each of these debates using its own measures. 
But given our limited collective attention span, we think 
there is some advantage in choosing to promote one 
additional indicator of economic prosperity.
Our preferred measure is (equivalised) median household 
income. It offers a better way of capturing the living 
standards experienced by households (Atkinson, 2011). 
And the focus on the median gives it some sensitivity to 
changes in the distribution of income (Jenkins, 2012), 
reminding users of the importance of inclusive growth.16 
Furthermore, it is possible to produce up-to-date 
measures of the evolution of median household income 
by making use of household survey data. Thus, median 
household income could be published on a timely basis 
alongside GDP. As more accurate information becomes 
available, the measures could be updated (for example, 
through so-called ‘nowcasting’ techniques). 
A new focus on median household income would, we 
believe, influence debates about growth policy. Median 
for formulating a plan to increase competition further 
and reduce concentration to promote efficiency and 
relationship lending in the retail banking sector.14
This would be a radical intervention, so before taking the 
step of referring such a proposal to the new Competition 
and Markets Authority with a narrow and time-limited 
remit, we recommend: liberalising entry conditions, 
including speeding up the process for obtaining a 
banking license; reviewing the application of prudential 
requirements to ensure that new entrants and smaller 
banks are not disproportionately affected, for example, 
by requirements to hold more capital than incumbents; 
and, introducing further measures to reduce switching 
costs across banks.
The Commission supports, with some provisos, current 
moves towards the creation of a Business Bank. At 
present, the remit of the bank is to deliver the existing 
programmes of the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS), with £1 billion (leveraged up to £10 
billion) for additional lending to manufacturers, 
exporters and high-growth firms. The rationale is that 
the bank will be able to access funds on more favourable 
terms than commercial banks (especially those currently 
saddled with a legacy of poor past investment decisions) 
and will therefore have a lower cost of capital.
The Business Bank’s lower cost of capital and remit to 
consider social returns would allow it to make loans 
that would typically be avoided by commercial banks. In 
particular, it would be able to take a wider economic view 
of the benefits of investing in certain sectors, including 
cases where there are potential long-term social returns 
from developing new technologies. This would mean a 
particular focus on lending for innovation investments to 
new and growing firms, which experience the most acute 
financial market failures and where the externalities will 
be greatest. Since this would include green technologies, 
there would be a case for folding the Green Investment 
Bank into the Business Bank.
The Business Bank should play an important role in 
creating a corporate bond market for SMEs. This would 
require a platform for SME loan securitisation along the 
lines advocated by the 2012 Breedon Review. By removing 
the requirement for investors to analyse the credit quality 
of many small issuances from individual SMEs, such a 
platform would relax SME financing constraints and 
kick-start institutional investment in these firms.
Beyond gdp
It is common to use GDP as a measure of economic 
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income growth has lagged behind GDP per capita since 
the early 1980s, in part because of the growth of income 
inequality so that average income has grown faster than 
the median. In the years running up to the crisis, GDP 
per capita grew much faster than median household 
income, in part because there was a significant increase 
in government spending on health and education, which 
is reflected in GDP but not in income. 
conclusion
We believe the LSE Growth Commission’s report is 
timely and is distinctive compared to previous efforts. 
It is timely because in the areas highlighted – skills, 
infrastructure and innovation – the UK is now at a 
crossroads, confronted by the need to make structural 
changes to rise to the challenges that lay ahead.  The 
status quo is no longer a viable option. It is distinctive 
since, unlike other reports, we have drawn on the best 
academic evidence and we have endeavoured to meet the 
political economy challenge head-on, making it integral 
to our analysis and recommendations.  
The proposition that the status quo is no longer a viable 
option is most vividly illustrated by infrastructure 
investment, especially electricity generation.  It has been 
clear for years that the UK’s power-generating capacity 
would come under pressure in the second half of this 
decade as there were plans in place to close down dirty 
coal and ageing gas plants. Yet, seven Secretaries of 
State and five white papers in the past ten years alone 
have been incapable of delivering a building block for 
the £100bn or more of new private investment needed 
to rebuild the UK’s generating capacity over the next 
decade. What was originally a long-term problem has 
now come home to roost – the risk of power shortages 
in four or five years is becoming ever greater. Further 
hand wringing and indecision will not keep the lights 
on. 
There is a similar urgency for change when it comes 
to addressing the UK’s failure to invest in skills and 
innovation. The world is changing rapidly and radically 
– in terms of technology, sustainability and the global 
balance of economic and political power. Some of 
these changes may not be benign, causing instability 
– financial, fiscal, social, political and environmental – 
and potentially derailing paths to increasing prosperity. 
We can anticipate some of the emerging patterns, 
but not others. This puts a premium on societies that 
encourage entrepreneurship, innovation, opportunity 
and discovery. Addressing our failure to invest in skills 
and innovation is a crucial step towards creating this 
kind of society. 
Our core proposals aim to break the damaging cycle of 
institutional churn, political procrastination and policy 
instability that have become engrained in a number of key 
policy areas. Indecision and instability are not inevitable 
outcomes of democratic accountability, but instead are 
the by-product of flaws in some of the institutions that 
define our democracy and which can be fixed.  
Whether the LSE Growth Commission is successful in 
influencing the direction of policy remains to be seen. So 
far, we have been able to generate substantial discussion 
in the media and among policymakers. The findings of 
the Commission offer a template for the engagement 
of academics in these important policy debates. The 
engagement with policy will not end with the report – 
the aim now is to try to build the consensus around a 
Manifesto for Growth. The challenge has never been 
greater given the pressures that mature economies are 
facing from international competition and a myriad of 
changes in the world.
notes
1 The Commissioners were Philippe Aghion, Tim Besley, John 
Browne, Francesco Caselli, Richard Lambert, Rachel Lomax, 
Chris Pissarides, Nick Stern and John Van Reenen. All material 
can be accessed from the website http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
researchAndExpertise/units/growthCommission/documents/
home.aspx.
2 The timing of parliamentary elections in the UK has been 
recently revised by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which 
sets the date of the next general election as 7 May 2015 and on 
the first Thursday in May in every fifth year thereafter.
3  According to the Department for Education, primary schools 
are underperforming unless one of the following criteria is met 
in English and maths: (i) at least 60 per cent of pupils achieve 
the expected level (level 4) or higher; overall; (ii) pupils make 
the expected degree of progress between the end of infants 
(Key Stage 1) and the end of juniors (Key Stage 2). Secondary 
schools are underperforming if less than 40 per cent of pupils 
achieve five good GCSE – or equivalent qualifications – graded 
A* to C, including English and maths (this threshold will rise to 
50 per cent by 2015); and fewer pupils make good progress in 
English and maths between Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 4 than 
the national average.
4 Academies have significantly greater freedoms in management 
(although, quite rightly, not the freedom to select their pupil 
intake on ability) and they are directly funded by the Department 
for Education.
5 See Romp and Haan (2007) for a review of the empirical 
literature.
6 For example, it has taken twelve years of reviews, white papers 
and some legislation for government to come forward with a 
substantial set of energy policy reforms (the most recent being 
the 2012 Energy Bill).
7 E.g. targets for fiscal policy often draw on measures of public 
debt while failing to account for the value (and depreciation) 
of public assets.
8 The Eddington review was commendable in that it (i) looked 
R12    natIonal InstItute eConomIC ReVIew No. 224 may 2013
at a clear, credible forward-thinking framework; (ii) tackled 
the problems and bottlenecks in terms of their severity and 
economic and social returns; and (iii) drew on strong academic 
advice. The fact that it got ‘buried’ illustrates the problem with 
UK policymaking and the inadequacies of the one-off review 
approach.
9 Further details are available at http://tinyurl.com/b79r79l.
10 E.g. macroeconomic stability, policies that affect competition, 
market access, finance, taxation and regulation.
11 Although the percentage of SME employers seeking finance in 
the past twelve months rose from 23 per cent (2007–8) to 26 
per cent (2010), there was evidence to show that demand for 
bank finance was declining. 56 per cent of SME employers that 
sought finance were seeking finance for working capital, while 
21 per cent were seeking it for investment purposes (OECD, 
2012b). 2011 survey evidence suggests that 74 per cent of SMEs 
seeking finance obtain it, but SMEs may not have obtained all the 
finance required and there are still market failures restricting 
viable SMEs from accessing finance (BIS, 2009, 2010, 2012).  
12 The other failures of investment that we highlight also act as 
a deterrent to private investment. Firms may be discouraged 
from investing in the UK by a lack of skilled labour. Thus, 
efforts to increase human capital are likely to provide a boost 
to investment by firms. Relatively low levels of public investment 
in infrastructure are a further impediment. So we see increases 
in private investment as an important further dividend from 
getting the right skills and infrastructure policies.
13 There have been several studies on this topic since 2000: the 
Cruickshank report into competition in UK banking (2000), the 
Competition Commission’s inquiry into SME Banking (2002), 
the OFT’s Survey of SME Banking (2006), the OFT’s Review of 
Barriers to Entry, Expansion and Exit in Retail Banking (2010) 
and the Final Report of the Independent Commission on Banking 
(2011).  
14 There is a flourishing empirical literature on this topic – e.g. 
Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Fischer, 2000; Ogura, 2007, 2010; 
Memmel et al., 2007; Strahan, 2008; Neuberger et al., 2008; 
Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2011; 
Canales and Nanda, 2012. For more details on this literature 
please consult http://tinyurl.com/dx8zj7q.
15 In 1934, Simon Kuznets (one of the originators of the GDP 
concept) warned the US Congress that “the welfare of a nation 
can scarcely be inferred from a measure of national income”. 
Thirty years later, in 1962 Kuznets reminded the Congress that 
“distinctions must be kept in mind between quantity and quality 
of growth, between its costs and return, and between the short 
and the long term. Goals for more growth should specify more 
growth of what and for what”.
16 The median is not perfect of course, because inequality can 
still widen at other parts of the distribution, but it is better 
than ignoring distribution entirely and it is relatively easy to 
communicate to the public.
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